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Abstract: Using a simple model of income redistribution, we examine the effect of income 
inequality on redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. Our results suggest that in the 
presence of tax evasion, higher income inequality may be associated with lower per capita 
transfers but inefficiently high taxation. This is because in countries characterized by weak 
institutional framework parties may increase the probability of winning the elections by 
choosing policies that expand the number of tax evading individuals.  
 
 
JEL: H10, H23, H26  
Keywords: redistribution, inequality, tax evasion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: We wish to thank Thomas Moutos and George Economides for many helpful 
comments and suggestions. We have also benefited from comments by Nikos Benos, Michael Chletsos, 
Anastasia Litina, Nikos Mylonides, Dimitris Panagiotou, Nikos Tsakiris as well as the participants at 
the seminar series of the University of Ioannina  Any remaining errors are ours. 
 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author 
 2
En général, l’art du gouvernement consiste à prendre le plus d’argent qu’on peut à une grande 
partie des citoyens, pour le donner à une autre partie.  
In general, the art of government consists in taking as much money as possible from one party of 
the citizens to give to the other. 
Voltaire.  
1. Introduction 
For long economists and political scientists alike, have been trying to answer what 
determines the extent and the nature of government redistributive programs. 
Following the seminal contributions of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer 
and Richard (1981), income redistribution is portrayed as the voting outcome in 
elections with office motivated parties who seek the support of the median voter. In 
all these models, as long as the income of the median voter is below the average 
income, the median voter will support policies that impose a positive tax rate on 
income accompanied with positive per capita transfers. Moreover there will be more 
redistribution the lower median income is relative to mean income (the higher is the 
inequality). 
 There is a large number of empirical studies examining the effect of increased 
income inequality on redistribution (see Borck, 2007 for a more complete review). 
However, the findings of the relevant literature are fairly mixed. Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994),  Milanovic (2000) and Scervini (2011) provide 
empirical evidence of a positive relationship between income inequality and 
redistribution whereas Perotti (1996), Rodriguez (1999) and Bassett et al. (1999) fail 
to report a robust relationship. Finally, Moene and Wallerstein (2003) point to a 
negative association between the two variables.  
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Contradicting empirical findings has led many researchers to modify some of the 
main assumptions of the theoretical models, which ultimately led to different 
conclusions. Roemer (1998) introduces a second dimension in the political 
competition process, Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley and Case (2003) 
underline the role of political institution on government redistribution programs 
whereas Epple and Romano (1996), Grossman (2003) and Katsimi and Moutos (2004) 
introduce redistribution through public provision of private goods.  
More recently a number of papers (Roine, 2006; Borck, 2009; Traxler, 2009; 
Traxler, 2012) have introduced tax evasion and avoidance in the standard model of 
income redistribution. The central finding of these papers is that in the presence of tax 
evasion, the tax system may be less redistributive than if everyone reported truthfully. 
Moreover if the tax evasion technology is such that the rich evade more than the poor, 
these models predict redistribution from the middle class towards both the poor and 
the rich. However, none of these models examine the effects of inequality on the level 
of redistribution, in the presence of tax evasion.  
In the present paper we seek to examine to impact of income inequality on 
redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. We build a rather standard model of 
redistribution in the presence of tax evasion (see e.g. Roine 2006; Borck, 2009; 
Traxler, 2009) where we assume that individuals are able to evade taxes by paying a 
lump sum cost. 1  This assumption guarantees that richer individuals are evading, 
whereas poor people pay taxes. In this setting, preferences are not necessarily single- 
peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property (Borck, 2009; Traxler, 2009). 
                                                 
1 The two papers most closely related to this one are Roine (2006) and Borck (2009). Both these papers 
examine and characterize median voter equilibrium, either numerically- as in Roine (2006) or by 
complete characterization of the voting outcomes- as in Borck (2009). Here instead we focus on a 
probabilistic voting equilibrium. This allows us to derive explicit equilibrium conditions, and well 
behaved comparative statics over wide parameter values. Moreover this also allows us to examine in a 
direct way the effect of inequality on the level of redistribution. 
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Therefore, the “identity” of the decisive voter may be unknown (and changing) and 
median voter theorem does not hold. In order to address this issue we assume that 
voting over the tax rate is probabilistic and this allows us to derive the political 
equilibrium level for redistribution.   
Under these assumptions- i.e., tax evasion by the rich and probabilistic voting- our 
model produces a number of interesting results. First, we show that there can be a 
negative relationship between inequality and redistribution. When inequality declines, 
then there are more individuals at the end of the income distribution, which ceteris 
paribus implies an increase in the share of evaders. Then the (political) equilibrium is 
restored by increasing the size of redistribution towards lower end of the income 
distribution, which can only be achieved by increasing spending.2 
Second, our model predicts that the equilibrium tax rate may be above the revenue 
maximizing tax rate. The economy therefore operates on the negatively slopped part 
of a “Laffer type curve”.3 This is because, in our model, an increase in the tax rates, 
apart from raising revenues to finance spending, also increases the number of tax 
evaders. Hence the office motivated parties propose a higher tax- than the one that 
maximizes revenues- in order to increase the welfare of those individuals that 
marginally choose to evade taxes when facing a higher tax rate. Then tax evasion is 
used by the government as a means of redistributing income to those individuals that 
increase the probability of winning the elections. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and shows 
how individuals choose whether to evade or not, as well as the effects of tax evasion 
on the level of revenues. In Section 3, we explain how the political equilibrium is 
                                                 
2 If the economy operates on the positively (negatively) sloped side of the “Laffer type curve” this is 
achieved by higher (lower) tax rate. 
3 In general, the theoretical justification for a Laffer curve, rests on the changes in factor supplies due to 
changes on the tax rate. Following Sanyal et al. (2000) we call the non- monotonic relationship 
between tax rates and revenues due to the presence of tax evasion, as “Laffer type curve”. 
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determined and derive the equilibrium conditions. In Section 4, the comparative 
statics of the endogenous variables with respect to changes in inequality are 
presented. As the results are in general ambiguous, we present the results of our 
numerical analysis. Finally Section 5 concludes.      
 
2. The model 
Consider an economy populated by a fixed number of risk neutral individuals, N.4 
Individuals differ in their income endowment, with ei standing for household’s i 
income. We assume that there is a continuum of individuals, [ ]0,1i∈ , and that their 
income endowment is  distributed according to a Pareto Probability Distribution 
Function (PDF). 
 
 1( ) , with α>1
a
a
bf e a
e +
=  (1) 
 
       
Parameter b  stands for the lowest income in the population, and parameter 
a determines the shape of the distribution- with higher values of a implying greater 
equality. The Pareto distribution, in addition to being easy to work with, is a relatively 
good approximation of actual income distributions. Empirical estimates of the value 
of a  range between 1.5 and 3.0 (see, Creedy (1977)).5  The mean of the Pareto 
distribution is equal to  
 
1
ab
a
μ = −  (2) 
 
                                                 
4 A more elaborate model would include risk averse individuals and endogenous labor supply. These 
features however add further non- linearities in the first order conditions, making the comparative 
statics intractable and causing the model to break down for a wide range of parameter values. Thus for 
the sake of clarity and keeping in line with the models of Roine (2006) and Borck (2009) we assume 
risk neutrality and exogenous income. 
5 These values correspond to a Gini coefficient in the range between 0.2 and 0.5. 
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The government levies a proportional tax on income, at a tax rate t, in order to 
finance per capita income transfers g. Therefore, the government redistributes income 
by taxing proportionally individual income and paying a fixed amount g to each i, 
irrespective of their income (reported or true). As we allow individuals to evade taxes 
the net beneficiaries of government spending are those that their tax payment based 
on their reported income is below the per capita transfers. Therefore redistribution 
occurs from those with higher than average reported income to those with lower 
reported income. As long as the distribution of reported incomes is different from the 
distribution of true incomes, redistribution does not necessarily take place from the 
rich to poor.  
Following Roine (2006) we assume that individuals may conceal a part ψ of their 
income from the tax authorities. This is achieved by incurring a fixed cost equal to θ. 
However, there is a fixed probability π that evaders will be audited and their income 
will be revealed. In this case this they pay a fine proportional to the total amount 
evaded, given by feit, where f>1. With risk- neutral individuals, this is equivalent to 
assuming that by paying a fixed cost θ, i can evade the payment of a share ψ(1-π)f of 
his tax payment. Hence, even though we model risky tax evasion, the assumption of 
risk- neutrality results to equivalent results to a model of legal tax avoidance.    
 
 2.1 Individual decisions 
Individuals in this economy face two decisions. A binary choice of whether they will 
evade or not and a political decision of how to vote for the tax rate and the consequent 
level of redistribution. The above imply that the utility of a tax evading individual i 
can be written as: 
 (1 )Ei i i iU e e t f e t gψ θ π ψ= − − − − +  (1) 
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whereas the utility of an individual which truthfully declares its income is  
 (1 )NEi iU e t g= − +  (2) 
 
Then individual i will choose to evade taxes, if the utility derived under tax 
evasion is greater than the utility by honestly declaring its income, i.e. if (1) is greater 
than (2), i.e.  
 
(1 )i
e
f t
θ
ψ π> −  (3) 
 
Letting if ε denote the level of income for which it holds that 
  
(1 )f t
θε ψ π= −   (4) 
it follows that only individuals with ei>ε will choose to tax evade ψ part of their 
income, and individuals with ei<ε will declare their full income and pay full taxes. In 
other words in the present model, the tax evading individuals are those top of the 
income distribution.6   
  Equation (4) reveals that ceteris- paribus, lower cost of tax evasion- i.e. lower θ-, 
or higher share of taxes evaded- i.e. higher ψ(1-π)f- results into a lower threshold 
income for tax evasions ε and consequently to more tax evasion. Moreover a higher 
tax rate t –which is endogenously determined in the political equilibrium- also results 
into a higher share of tax evaders in total population.  
  
2.2 Government 
                                                 
6  This is consistent with the empirical evidence; studies on the effect on tax evasion on income 
inequality show that the share of tax evasion is positively correlated with income (see for example 
Pashardes and Polycarpou, 2008; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010). Moreover the results of the 1999 
World Values Survey show that the share of respondents disagreeing with the statement “cheating on 
taxes if you have the chance is never justified” is greater for individuals at high than low income levels. 
For example, in Greece 69.9% of high income respondents disagreed with the statement (compared to 
the 57.4% for the low income respondents), whereas for Italy the corresponding figures were 48.2% 
and 40.2% and for the Japan 19.5% and 14% respectively. 
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The government receives income tax revenues and fines from those caught tax 
evading. We assume that it uses all these revenues in order to finance per capita 
transfers, g.  
Then using the PDF of the Pareto distribution, the total tax receipts of the 
government are equal to:  
 1(1 )
a
a
bt N t f N e a de
eε
μ ψ π ∞ +⎛ ⎞Τ = − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (5) 
 
Equation (5) states that total collected taxes are equal to total revenues in the absence 
of tax evasion (i.e. tμN) minus the net (i.e. excluding fines) total amount evaded. 
According to (5) higher θ, π and f, i.e. higher cost of tax evasion, higher probability of 
detection and higher penalty are associated with higher revenue. 
 The above equation, presents a Laffer- type relationship between the tax rate and 
total government revenues. Typically the Laffer curve represents a non- linear effect 
between the tax rate and total revenues due to changes in factor supplies (see for 
example Minford and Ashton, 1991). Here the non- linear effect is derived from the 
incentives for tax evasion: increases on t, changes the level of income for which the 
individual is indifferent between evading and truthfully declaring its income, i.e. ε, 
inducing an increase in tax evading individuals (see also Sanyal et al., 2000). In other 
words a higher tax increases the share of individuals for which tax evasion has a 
positive net benefit. Thus the overall effect of a change in t is ambiguous: on the hand 
a higher t results into higher revenues, by increasing the share of taxes received, 
whereas on the other hand a higher t reduces declared income, reducing overall 
revenues.   
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Given the setup of our model, equation (5) is concave in t. We can therefore 
derive a unique revenue maximizing tax rate, by simply differentiating (5) with 
respect to t  
 
1
max 1 1 1(1 )
a a
a a at f a
b
θψ π− − −= −  (6)
  
As all tax revenues are used to finance per capita transfers g, the government 
budget constraint can be written as:  
 ( ) 1(1 ) 1
a
a a a aabg t t f
a
μ ψ π θ −= − − −  (7) 
 
3. Political equilibrium  
In the above general setting described preferences are not in general single- 
peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property. The rationale for this is as follows: 
consider an individual with income above the average. As long as the tax rate (t) is so 
low that the individual does not evade, his utility is an decreasing function of t. This is 
because individual’s tax payment is larger than the per capita transfers he receives. 
Thus, he votes against higher taxes. However as t rises, there exists a threshold above 
which the individual chooses to evade taxes. For t above that threshold, utility is 
increasing in t, due to the fact that the individual is a net beneficiary of government 
spending (and as long as t<tmax). This is because the individual no longer pay taxes 
whereas at the same time receives positive per capita transfers. In this case, he votes 
for higher taxation. 
When preferences are not single- peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property 
the “identity” of the decisive voter may be unknown (and changing) and median voter 
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theorem does not hold.7 To overcome this problem, we assume that taxes are chosen 
though probabilistic voting.8 The political mechanism works as follows: before any 
individual choices are made (i.e. before individuals choose whether to tax evade or 
not), there is voting among the population about the level of t and g. In these 
elections, two political parties compete over winning the elections, by proposing a tax 
rate t. Then the level of g follows directly from equation (7). After the elections the 
winning party (government) implements the proposed policy.  
We assume that each individual votes with a positive, but not necessarily equal to 
1, probability the party’s proposal that gives him the highest utility. 9  Under 
probabilistic voting each party seeks to maximize its expected vote share given the 
expected vote share of the other party. The maximization problem of each party 
implements the maximum of the following weighted Benthamite social welfare 
function (Muller, 2003, p. 253- 259):  
 [ ] [ ]1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
a a
i i ia ab
i i
ab abW k e t g de e t f e t g de
e e
ε
ε θ ψ π
∞
+ +⎡ ⎤= − + + − − − − +⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  (8) 
 
where k is the relative weight of the non- evaders in the utility of the government.10  
Maximizing (8) subject to the government budget constraint (7), with respect to t, 
yields the following first order condition 
 
                                                 
7 In order to obtain political equilibrium, a number of solutions has been provided, for example Roine 
(2006) develops a numerical method which allows him to explore the political equilibria and Borck 
(2009) proceeds by complete characterization of the voting outcomes. 
8 Probabilistic voting has been used extensively when the median voter thereom does not hold. For 
example De La Croix and Doepke (2009) use a probabilistic voting equilibrium when preferences are 
not single peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property, whereas Lin et al. (1999) and Adams (1999) 
assume probabilistic vote in a multi-party model of electoral competition.  
9 The idea behind probabilistic voting is that voters care about non- observable variables to the policy 
choices, like ideology, voter turnout, character of the candidates, influence of campaign advertising etc. 
(see Coughlin, 1992; Hinich and Munger, 1997, p.171- 177). 
10 In the numerical results that follow we assume that k<1. This is necessary for a well defined solution 
that satisfies the second order conditions of the problem. This implies that the government places 
greater weight on the utility of the tax evaders, which however may be in equilibrium the majority of 
the population. 
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[ ]
1
1 1
2
(1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
1 1 (1 )
( 2) (1 ) (1 )
                                                                  0
( 1) (1 )
a a
a a aa b b tt k f k
a a f t
a f k k
a f t
θθ ψ π θ ψ π
θ ψπ ψ ψ
ψ π
−
− −++ − − − + − +− − −
− − − − −+ =− −
(9) 
 
The solution to equation (9) gives the equilibrium tax rate, denoted as t*. Then 
equation (7) can be directly used to determine g.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The effect of inequality 
As can be easily verified, equation (9) cannot be solved analytically for t*, 
however it can used to derive the comparative statics effect of changes in the 
(in)equality parameter a. Total differentiating (9), and solving yields after some 
simplifications:  
 
[ ]
[ ]
1ˆ ˆ2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 log ( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆ
( 1) ˆ ˆ2 2(1 ) ( 2) (1 ) (1 )ˆ ˆ
a
a
b bt k b f k k a
tdt
da a b k a f k k
t
θε ψπ ψ ψ ε ε
θ θ ε ε ψπ ψ ψε
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − + − − − − + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤− ⎛ ⎞− − − − − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   (10) 
 
where hats above variables indicate the underlying equilibrium values of t and ε. From 
the second order conditions of the maximization problem, the denominator of (10) is 
negative. However the numerator of (10) can be either positive or negative depending 
on the underlying parameter values. In what follows we try to numerically determine 
the relationship between α and t, and to give the intuition behind our main result.  
Since our interest lies on the effects of a—ceteris paribus—change in inequality, 
and changes in a affect the average ability (and income) in the economy, in the 
following figures we depict the relationship between inequality and the variables of 
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interest for a given level of average ability (by changing the underlying value of b). 
Following the empirical estimates of Creedy (1977) we assumed that a takes values 
between 1.5 and 3.0. The rest of the parameter values used in the following figures are 
f=1.2, π=0.05, k=0.85, μ=0.3, ψ=0.75. These values guarantee that the second order 
conditions of the maximization problem are satisfied, all endogenous variables of the 
model satisfy the underlying non- negativity constraints and that the equilibrium share 
of tax evading households takes on realistic values (i.e. undeclared income up to 
around 50%, as in Schneider, 2005).11 
The following figure depicts the relationship between a and the equilibrium tax 
rate t* for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04. Moreover in each diagram we also depict revenue 
maximizing tax rate, denoted maxt  and the per capita transfer g as a share of average 
income μ as these are crucial for understanding the intuition behind the underlying 
relationship between a and t* 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between t and a, for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04 
Our main results can be summarized along the following lines. Firstly, the effect 
of a change in a on the per capita transfers (g) is non- linear. However, for a wide 
range of values for α (in the first diagram of Figure 1 for α<2.7 and in the second 
                                                 
11 See figure 2 below. 
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diagram for α<2.5) there is a negative association between income inequality and g. 
Therefore in the presence of tax evasion the standard positive relationship between 
income inequality and redistribution may be reversed.  
The intuition behind the above relationship can be better understood using the 
properties of the probabilistic voting model. The political equilibrium is achieved 
when the marginal welfare of the two groups (evaders and non- evaders) is equalized 
(Mueller, 2003). Consider then an increase in a. Due to the Pareto distribution, for 
given t, higher a implies an increase in the share of the tax evading households (more 
individuals with income above ε) and thus the marginal utility of the evaders becomes 
greater than the marginal utility of the non –evaders. In order to restore the 
equilibrium, political parties propose a higher t* as this will increase the marginal 
welfare of the non- evaders and restore the equilibrium. When max*t t< , the new 
equilibrium is reached by also lowering marginal welfare of evaders, whereas When 
max*t t>  , the marginal utility of the evaders is also increasing in t thus in the new 
equilibrium the marginal utility of the evaders is also higher.  
 
4.2 Equilibrium tax rate above the revenue maximizing tax rate 
Figure 1 also shed light to our second result. Specifically, there is a range of 
parameter values for which t* is higher than t max. In this case the government chooses 
a tax rate on the negatively sloped side of the Laffer type curve, and increases in t* 
are associated with falling per capita transfers. As can be verified, this occurs for 
relatively large values of α. The rationale for this is as follows: taxation redistributes 
income by changing (i) net transfers and (ii) the share of tax evading individuals. The 
probabilistic voting mechanism ensures that political parties equalize the marginal 
benefits of a higher t on (i) and (ii). For low values of α, parties increase the share of 
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expected votes by redistributing between rich and poor. Whereas for high α (i.e. 
higher equality) the gains in terms of expected votes, are achieved through expanding 
the number of tax evading individuals rather than from redistributing income to the 
existing net recipients. Thus when α is high, parties propose a tax rate above the one 
that maximizes revenues. 
The following figure presents the relationship between a and the share of evade 
income, for two levels of θ.  
 
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
α
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
evaded income
θ=0.05
θ=0.04
 
Figure 2: Relationship between evaded income and a, for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04 
 
When θ is lower, political parties try to expand the number of expected votes by 
proposing a t that increases the number of tax evaders. This is consistent with the 
result in figure 1, where it is clear when θ is smaller the range of values of α, over 
which t*>tmax is greater.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that in the presence of tax evasion, higher income inequality 
may be associated with lower redistribution and that a government that cares enough 
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for the tax evading population, may impose a greater tax rate than the one required to 
maximize revenue. These results have important bearings both on a theoretical level 
as well as for policy recommendations. On the theoretical front, the present paper has 
shown that in the presence of tax evasion the relationship between inequality and 
government transfers may be reversed. Since the relevant empirical literature on the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution does not take into account the role 
of institutions, our analysis may provide a potential explanation for the lack of clear 
cut empirical evidence (see e.g. Perotti,1996; Bassett et al.,1999; Rodriguez,1999). 
Moreover it provides a clear testable hypothesis for empirical research: inequality 
may positively affect redistribution only in countries with low tax evasion, shadow 
economy and corruption. For the rest of the countries the Meltzler and Richard (1981) 
effect may be the exact opposite.  
The conclusions of the present analysis can also be generalized further. Here we 
have shown that the government (or to be more specific the political parties running 
for office) use taxation in order to increase tax evasion- which increases the welfare of 
a specific segment of the electorate- as a means to increase their expected vote share. 
In a more general setting this implies that the degree of tax evasion is not necessarily 
an exogenous constraint for the government. Rather it may be used by the politicians 
in order to get re- elected. In the present setting this leads even to a tax rate higher 
than the revenue maximizing tax rate. More generally it implies that policies 
implemented may be highly inefficient.   
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